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U.S. farm programs are once again under scrutiny as Con-gress gears up to determine 
what to do with the 2007 farm bill. 
The new chair of the House Commit-
tee on Agriculture, Collin Peterson 
from Minnesota, has added a new 
dimension to the discussion with 
his call for adoption of a stand-
ing disaster payment program as a 
permanent part of the farm bill. His 
proposal expands this year’s farm 
bill debate because consideration of 
the merits of a standing disaster pro-
gram will inevitably draw in a dis-
cussion about what to do with the 
crop insurance program. After all, 
as former USDA under secretary J.B. 
Penn pointed out in 2006 testimony 
before the House Subcommittee on 
Agriculture, “One of the overarching 
goals of the crop insurance program 
has been the reduction or elimina-
tion of ad hoc disaster assistance.” 
If Congress moves in the opposite 
direction and passes a permanent 
disaster program, then a major 
policy rationale for a subsidized 
crop insurance program is called 
into question. 
In the past, when ad hoc disas-
ter payments have been authorized, 
farmers who suffer a yield decline 
of greater than 35 percent qualify 
for the payments. The similarity of 
this disaster coverage to current 
crop insurance coverage is readily 
apparent because the most popular 
crop insurance coverage triggers 
payments when yield or revenue de-
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clines by 30 percent (see the graph 
above). This similarity raises a 
number of policy questions. Should 
Congress continue to subsidize 
crop insurance coverage if it is go-
ing to give every farmer 65 percent 
disaster assistance coverage? Is 
taxpayer support for disaster pay-
ments more benefi cial to farmers 
than taxpayer support for crop 
insurance? Would farmers still buy 
crop insurance if Congress provid-
ed free disaster coverage as part of 
the farm bill? Is the 35 percent loss 
threshold too high to provide mean-
ingful disaster assistance? If so, 
could current commodity programs 
be changed to work with disaster-
type assistance that could provide 
more meaningful coverage? 
Disaster Assistance versus 
Crop Insurance
Although a standing disaster as-
sistance program has the potential 
to duplicate much of the cover-
age offered by the crop insurance 
program, there are some important 
differences. Many farmers purchase 
revenue insurance policies rather 
than yield insurance policies. Thus, 
crop insurance provides coverage 
against price changes and yield 
losses whereas disaster programs 
typically cover yield declines. In 
addition, crop insurance programs 
allow producers to choose their own 
deductible, whereas past disaster 
programs have a fi xed percent de-
ductible. And most producers buy 
crop insurance at a price level of 100 
percent, which means that losses 
are compensated at 100 percent 
of the crop price rather than at 65 
percent of price, the level used to 
calculate disaster payments. 
But despite these differences, 
65 percent disaster coverage would 
duplicate a signifi cant portion of the 
coverage provided by a 70 percent 
crop insurance policy. That the two 
programs provide duplicate cover-
age is well recognized by Congress; 
consider, for instance, that in years 
Crop insurance coverage levels for program crops in 2006
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when a farmer qualifi es for both a 
crop insurance payment and a disas-
ter payment, the disaster payment is 
capped so that the farmer does not 
receive compensation that exceeds 
the value of a normal crop. The fact 
that producers receive double pay-
ments for crop losses is sometimes 
cited as one of the benefi ts of having 
both disaster payments and crop 
insurance because the combination 
substantially increases total pay-
ments when a loss is severe. 
For most farmers, availability of 
free or subsidized base insurance 
coverage at a 65 or 70 percent cover-
age level provides assurance that 
assistance will be provided when 
a true disaster strikes their crop. 
But does it really make sense to use 
scarce farm bill funding to duplicate 
coverage that is already available 
to farmers? An alternative use of 
funds would be to design a program 
that would complement rather than 
duplicate crop insurance coverage. 
Two examples of complementary 
programs have been developed by 
the National Corn Growers Associa-
tion (NCGA) and American Farmland 
Trust. Before examining these pro-
grams, a basic question that should 
be addressed is whether the current 
public/private provision of insur-
ance coverage through the crop 
insurance program best serves the 
interests of farmers and taxpayers. 
A recent study of the distribution of 
benefi ts from crop insurance pro-
vides some insights.
Farmer Benefi ts versus 
Industry Benefi ts
In a previous Iowa Ag Review article 
(Summer 2006), we reported that 
since 2001, taxpayers have spent 
$15.1 billion supporting the crop in-
surance program. Farmers received 
$8.8 billion of this amount, with 
the $6.3 billion balance being paid 
to crop insurance companies and 
agents to administer the program. 
We pointed out that large underwrit-
ing gains were a major source of 
industry gains. Proponents of the 
program criticized our analysis by 
claiming that the industry takes on a 
portion of possible losses from crop 
insurance policies and that the gains 
they have obtained over the last fi ve 
years is just compensation for the 
risk they divert from taxpayers.
Whether taxpayers would be 
better served taking on this risk 
themselves is an important ques-
tion. The answer depends in part 
on the price that taxpayers pay the 
industry to take on risk. If the price 
is too high, then taxpayers would be 
better served by adopting a stand-
ing disaster program or by reform-
ing commodity programs so that 
payments are triggered by revenue 
declines rather than yield declines. 
Calculating the “price” that 
taxpayers pay for transferring risk 
to the crop insurance industry 
is not a straightforward exercise 
because all possible risk scenarios 
must be considered. In an effort 
to understand how much risk is 
being absorbed by the industry 
and the price that taxpayers are 
paying to lower their exposure, we 
conducted an analysis of Group 
Risk Income Protection (GRIP) in 
Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana for corn 
and soybeans (see CARD Working 
Paper 07-WP 440 by Paulson and 
Babcock, available at www.card.
iastate.edu/ publications). In 2006, 
GRIP was the most popular crop 
insurance product purchased by 
Illinois corn farmers. Because 
GRIP provides coverage against 
either national price declines or 
yield declines at the county level, 
it offers an alternative to current 
commodity programs that provide 
coverage only against price 
declines.
The table on the next page sum-
marizes some results. The average 
insurance payout if every corn and 
soybean producer in Iowa, Illinois, 
and Indiana purchased GRIP would 
be $47.05/acre. This number as-
sumes that each farmer bought the 
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maximum coverage (most do), that 
they bought the Harvest Revenue 
Option (most do), and that insur-
ance prices are $3.75/bu for corn, 
$7.00/bu for soybeans, and price 
volatilities are 27 percent for corn 
and 20 percent for soybeans. 
To obtain the expected payout 
of $47.05, farmers would have to 
pay $27.67, giving them an average 
net benefi t of $19.38 per acre. As 
compensation for taking on risk, 
insurance companies will receive 
an expected payment of $11.50/
acre. Adding in other administra-
tive costs takes the total indus-
try payment to $23.30/acre. Thus, 
under GRIP, 55 percent of taxpayer 
funding fl ows to the insurance in-
dustry, whereas 45 percent fl ows 
to farmers. It is also interesting to 
note that the per acre cost of GRIP 
exceeds the projected cost of any 
of the other commodity programs, 
making crop insurance the costliest 
farm program currently offered.
The Price of Transferring Risk 
to Insurance Companies
Is $11.50 per acre a fair price for the 
risk that taxpayers “sell” to crop in-
surance companies? This is a diffi cult 
question, but we can gain some in-
sight by thinking about the problem 
in terms of odds on a gamble and in 
terms of buying an insurance policy. 
What Are the Odds?
First, let’s look at the costs of risk 
in terms of a gamble. Note that the 
$11.50 “price” that taxpayers pay 
to crop insurance companies is an 
average, not a certain payment. This 
average includes years in which 
companies lose money, thereby 
absorbing some losses that taxpay-
ers would otherwise cover, as well 
as years in which companies make 
money from the program. Possible 
company losses range from $0 to $61 
per acre. The average loss across 
all years in which the companies 
lose money is approximately $23 
per acre. The range of gains is $0 to 
$30 per acre, with an average gain in 
years that companies make money 
also equal to about $23 per acre. If 
the chance of a loss year were equal 
to the chance of a gain year, then 
this would be an even-odds gamble, 
and over the long run taxpayers and 
companies would break even. If the 
odds were even then the average 
payment to crop insurance compa-
nies (that is, the price of risk) would 
be zero. However, we estimate that 
the chance of a gain year is three 
times larger than the chance of a 
loss year. Thus the odds are tilted in 
favor of the crop insurance compa-
nies. In exchange for taking on an 
average loss of $23 one year out of 
four, companies receive $23 three 
years out of four. That is, the fair 
value of this bet is $11.50 in favor of 
the crop insurance companies.
A Taxpayer Insurance Policy
Another way to think about these 
gains and losses is that taxpayers 
buy an insurance policy from crop 
insurance companies. Each year 
taxpayers pay insurance companies 
a premium of $23 per acre. In three 
years out of four, taxpayers do not 
collect, so they lose their premium. 
In one year out of four, taxpayers 
pay their premium but receive an 
insurance payment of $46. Dividing 
the average payment received by 
the premium collected is called the 
“loss ratio.” In this case, the ex-
pected loss ratio is 0.5, meaning that 
taxpayers get back only $0.50 for 
each $1.00 of premium paid. From 
the company’s viewpoint, a $0.50 
average risk brings a $1.00 expected 
return—a 100 percent rate of return. 
To put this rate of return into 
perspective, an alternative approach 
would be for the U.S. government 
to borrow the amount of money 
needed to cover the losses taken on 
by the insurance industry and pay 
an interest rate of 5 percent. This 
loan could be paid off in years of un-
derwriting gains. In the end, taxpay-
ers could do much better than pay a 
price of $11.50 per acre.
Combining Individual 
Insurance Coverage with 
Commodity Programs
With the current high commodity 
prices, the crop insurance program 
now costs more than any other pro-
gram, with most of the costs going 
to provide insurance to the crops 
that also receive commodity pay-
ments: corn, soybeans, wheat, cot-
ton, rice, and grain sorghum. Farm 
groups in major producing states 
are asking themselves whether their 
interests are best served by a pro-
gram in which more than 50 percent 
of program costs are siphoned off to 
pay agents for selling the insurance 
and to companies for taking on a 
portion of risk.
Adoption of a standing disas-
ter program or either of two major 
proposals that farm groups are con-
sidering would dramatically change 
the distribution of benefi ts from 
one that favors the crop insurance 
industry to one that favors farmers. 
A standing disaster program would 
Impact of selling GRIP in the Corn Belt
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directly transfer a large portion of 
the risk currently taken on by the 
crop insurance industry directly to 
U.S. taxpayers, thereby lowering both 
underwriting gains and other costs 
of running the program. A proposal 
being considered by the NCGA would 
replace marketing loans and coun-
tercyclical payments with a target 
revenue program at the county level 
that would also transfer a signifi cant 
amount of risk away from the crop in-
surance program. Most of the remain-
ing risk would be transferred with 
the second part of the NCGA pro-
gram, which would provide coverage 
against individual losses. The Ameri-
can Farmland Trust has proposed 
something similar. Its proposal would 
create a target revenue program at 
the national level that would take a 
signifi cant amount of risk away from 
the crop insurance program, espe-
cially in major production regions. 
The remaining residual risk would be 
covered by a modifi ed crop insur-
ance program that would deduct 
payments made by the national pro-
gram from individual losses before an 
insurance claim is settled. 
Any of these modifi cations of 
current farm policy would signifi -
cantly shift tax support away from 
the crop insurance industry to 
direct support of farm income. If 
Congress ultimately concludes that 
its efforts to wean agriculture away 
from disaster assistance programs 
through an expanded crop insur-
ance program have failed, then 
some combination of these three 
proposed new approaches would 
seem to offer a viable, cost-effec-
tive alternative. Combining bottom-
up base coverage at the individual 
farmer level with top-down cover-
age of a target revenue program is 
one alternative. The bottom-up cov-
erage could be in the form of the so-
called wrap coverage proposed by 
American Farmland Trust, a stand-
ing disaster program, as proposed 
by Congressman Peterson, or the 
NCGA’s individual revenue insur-
ance program. ◆ 
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most surplus corn, at 1.4 billion 
bushels, but Iowa, Minnesota, In-
diana, and Nebraska all had over 
500 million bushels of surplus 
corn each.
Corn Utilization and Surpluses for 
Projected 2008
For 2008, we have assumed that 
the U.S. produces 12.6 billion 
bushels, based on trend yields and 
an increase in U.S. corn planting to 
around 89 million acres. We held 
state-level livestock feeding and 
other corn processing constant 
at 2004 levels but allowed state-
level corn usage for ethanol to 
shift, reflecting the ongoing con-
struction in the ethanol industry. 
We assumed that all of the plants 
listed on the CARD ethanol plants 
Web page (http://www.card.iastate.
edu/research/bio/tools/ethanol.
aspx) would be in production dur-
ing the 2008/09 crop year. Because 
the plants under construction are 
concentrated in a few regions of 
the country, ethanol’s expansion 
will shift the location of domestic 
surplus and how much is available. 
Given our assumptions, nationwide 
there would be a total of just over 
800 million bushels of domestic 
surplus corn available for export 
to other countries or to place in 
stocks. The acreage increase is not 
enough to offset completely the 
combination of a return to trend 
yields and the expansion of ethanol. 
Fifteen states produce more corn 
than they use. Wisconsin changes 
from a net exporter of corn to a net 
importer. Illinois holds fi rm at 1.4 
billion bushels of surplus corn, but 
other midwestern states experience 
sizable drops in surplus corn. Iowa 
falls from second to third in surplus 
corn, as the state will have only 400 
million bushels left after accounting 
for in-state uses. Nebraska and In-
diana also have signifi cant drops in 
surplus corn. Nebraska’s domestic 
surplus corn falls 400 million bush-
els from 2004 levels; Indiana’s drops 
200 million. Corn importing states, 
such as Kansas and Texas, increase 
their use of corn to fuel their new 
ethanol plants as well. The expan-
sion of the ethanol industry could 
have dramatic effects on the U.S. 
corn sector and on the other uses 
for U.S. corn. If sizable declines in 
surplus corn in Iowa, Nebraska, and 
Indiana occur, it should translate 
into higher corn prices within those 
states. Illinois and Minnesota, with 
their relatively stable supplies of 
surplus corn, stand to be the tar-
gets for states and countries look-
ing for sources of cheaper corn. ◆
